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 Recovery is ―the regaining of or possibility of regaining something lost or taken 
away;‖ or ―restoration or return to any former and better state or condition.‖1  This is 
what we need for the thousands of species we have battered and exiled to the brink of 
extinction.  Recovery is the heart and soul of the Endangered Species Act
2
 (ESA) and the 
reason for its enactment.  If we look closely at the goals and structure of the Act, we will 
find recovery‘s primary support in the provisions dealing with critical habitat designation 
and protection – provisions that the implementing agencies and many commentators have 
attempted to completely write out of the statute.  Their interpretation is wrong, and while 
this reality is gradually gaining recognition, little is being done to move closer to what 
Congress intended.  There has been little to no improvement in the problems plaguing 
both designation of critical habitat and protection of that which has been designated.  It is 
time we took a closer look at critical habitat in order to revive it, as it is an endangered 
provision. 
 
I. Introduction 
 The primary goal Congress expressed in the ―Purposes‖ subsection of the ESA 
was ―to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which threatened and endangered 
species depend may be conserved.‖3  This is a reference to habitat conservation, which is 
a key element of the Act.  Conservation biologists had already determined that habitat 
loss is the single most important factor in species extinction, and that habitat protection is 
essential to recovery.  This understanding and concern was the foundation upon which 
                                                 
1
 Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/recovery 
(accessed: March 16, 2010). 
2
 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
3
 Id. § 1531(b). 
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Congress built the ESA.
4
  The terms ―conservation‖ and ―recovery‖ are used 
synonymously in the ESA,
5
 so protecting habitat with an eye toward recovery for at-risk 
species was clearly a key part of what Congress had set out to accomplish.  To that end, 
Congress tasked the implementing agencies with designating critical habitat for each 
species listed as endangered or threatened under the Act,
6
 and then provided special 
protections for that habitat.
7
  Unfortunately, nearly four decades later, critical habitat has 
yet to become the recovery tool it was meant to be. 
 There has been a great deal of confusion among courts, agencies, developers, and 
environmental organizations regarding the legal, environmental, and economic impacts of 
designating critical habitat for species listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA.  
Indeed, critical habitat has been called ―the front line‖ of the ESA battleground.8  At the 
heart of this difficulty has been a need to understand the degree to which the protections 
for critical habitat can be distinguished from those for listed species generally.  Critical 
habitat is primarily protected in the context of federal agencies consulting with the Fish & 
Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service to determine whether a 
                                                 
4
 See 119 cong. Rec. 30,528 (1973) (Rep. Lehman: ―The new law recognizes that the greatest threat to 
endangered animals has been man's destruction of their habitat.‖  See also 119 cong. Rec. 25,676 (1973) 
(Sen. Stevens: ―One of the major causes of the decline in wildlife populations is the destruction of their 
habitat.‖); 119 cong. Rec. 30,162 (1973) (Rep. Sullivan: ―For the most part, the principal threat to animals 
stems from the destruction of their habitat.‖). 
5
 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (―The terms ‗‗conserve,‘‘ ‗‗conserving,‘‘ and ‗‗conservation‘‘ mean to use and the 
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened 
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary.‖). 
6
 Id. § 1533(a)(3) (―The Secretary, by regulation promulgated in accordance with subsection (b) and to the 
maximum extent prudent and determinable— (A) shall, concurrently with making a determination under 
paragraph (1) that a species is an endangered species or a threatened species, designate any habitat of such 
species which is then considered to be critical habitat‖). 
7
 Id. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring federal agencies to insure that their actions do not adversely modify critical 
habitat). 
8
 Scott Norris, Only 30: A Portrait of the Endangered Species Act as a Young Law, 54 BIOSCIENCE 288, 291 
(2004).  See also John G. Sidle, Critical Habitat Designation: Is It Prudent?, 11 ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT 429, 429 (1987) (―Critical habitat designation for federally listed endangered and threatened 
species in the United States is one of the most controversial and misunderstood provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act.‖). 
 4 
proposed federal action either jeopardizes a listed species or adversely modifies its 
designated critical habitat.
9
  For most of ESA history these agencies deemed the jeopardy 
standard and the adverse modification standard to be identical (the ―functional 
equivalence policy,‖ which is discussed in more detail in Part III), such that critical 
habitat added no further protection beyond listing.  This understanding is reflected in the 
regulations defining jeopardy and adverse modification, which codify it.
10
  This perceived 
redundancy led them to designate critical habitat quite rarely and protect that which had 
been designated quite poorly. 
Recent case-law, however, has made adjustments to both of these standards, 
separately from one another, and now the landscape is far more complex.
11
  On the 
critical habitat side, this has come up in the context of a challenge to the Fish & Wildlife 
Service's method of analyzing the economic impact of a particular critical habitat 
designation (a factor required by the ESA), which depends heavily on the relationship 
between these two protective standards.  If critical habitat indeed added no further 
protections to those already enjoyed by listed species, what economic impact could 
designation really have?  The jeopardy standard tends to be challenged in cases dealing 
with its direct application during the consultation process, as does the critical habitat 
standard, which is also raised in the context of failure to designate.  Because the two 
standards have been addressed separately and in a variety of contexts, there is little court 
guidance on the relationship between the two. 
                                                 
9
 Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to ―insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried 
out by such agency … is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such species … 
.‖  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
10
 See infra Part II.B. 
11
 See infra Part IV. 
 5 
Understanding this relationship is essential to understanding critical habitat itself, 
as its value exists entirely in relation to the protection from jeopardy that listed species 
already enjoy.  Commentators have argued repeatedly, and the implementing agencies 
have agreed, that critical habitat adds no value beyond listing,
12
 ignoring the simple fact 
that Congress expressly provided for the designation and protection of critical habitat, 
presumably for a reason.  It must serve a purpose, as it defies norms of statutory 
interpretation to suggest that Congress would require an agency to engage in a process 
that was to have no impact at all.  However, we will never be able to understand this 
relationship, and thus the value of critical habitat itself, until we clearly define both 
standards of protection and think through Congress‘ holistic plan. 
The foundation of this article is to demonstrate, via statutory interpretation and 
scientific support, that critical habitat absolutely must add value beyond listing and that 
this value is in the form of a greater focus on recovery of the species.  Ultimately, this 
article is a call to action.  In particular, I ask that the agencies recognize this reality, not 
merely in the wake of lost litigation but in a clearly defined and permanent manner, as 
this is the only effective form of recognition.  I propose that the regulations setting the 
consultation standards be redrafted to reflect this distinction and that the method for 
designating critical habitat be modified to reflect the new standards.  Finally, and perhaps 
most important, we absolutely must get caught up with designation of critical habitat for 
the species already listed as threatened or endangered. 
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., Nicholas C. Fantl, Not So Critical Designations: The Superfluous Nature of Critical Habitat 
Designations under the Endangered Species Act, 57 Ark L. Rev. 143 (2004); Robert J. Scarpello, Statutory 
Redundancy: Why Congress Should Overhaul the Endangered Species Act to Exclude Critical Habitat 
Designation, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 399 (2003) (arguing that we should do away with critical habitat 
because it offers no additional protections over listing but wastes time with litigation anyway); Shawn E. 
Smith, How “Critical” is a Critical Habitat?: The United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Duty Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 8 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 343 (1999). 
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II. The Fundamentals of Critical Habitat 
 In order to discuss the issues most central to this article, it is necessary first to 
provide the relevant statutory and regulatory framework.  The Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) provides a process for listing threatened and endangered species.
13
  The decision 
whether to list a species is to be based on several factors, one of which is ―the present or 
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range.‖14  Thus, 
habitat concerns do play into the listing decision itself, but as will be discussed further 
below, this does not conflate listing with habitat designation. 
Once listed, species receive protection in several forms.  The form most people 
are aware of is the prohibition against ―taking‖ individual members of a listed species,15 
which is an important route to protection from private parties.  However, it does far less 
to promote recovery than the form of protection applicable to this article, which is the 
requirement that all federal agencies ―insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried 
out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
[designated critical] habitat of such species.‖16  In order to avoid jeopardy or adverse 
modification, the action agency is required to consult with the appropriate ESA-
implementing agency (either the Fish & Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, depending on the species, hereinafter jointly referred to as ―the Services‖) any 
                                                 
13
 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). 
14
 Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A). 
15
 See Id. § 1538(a)(1). 
16
 Id. § 1536(2). 
 7 
time an action might affect a listed species.
17
  The consulting agency then issues its 
opinion as to whether the action will jeopardize the species or adversely modify its 
designated critical habitat.
18
  This opinion is not binding, but it is guidance that will be 
given weight in court should the action agency‘s later decisions be challenged. 
 
 A. Designation 
 The ESA requires that critical habitat be designated ―concurrently‖ with listing a 
species as threatened or endangered, at least ―to the maximum extent prudent and 
determinable.‖19  The ―prudent and determinable‖ language has been used as a source of 
discretion by the Services, forcing the courts to define and limit the terms.
20
  One of the 
factors to consider in designating critical habitat is the economic impact of doing so, 
though this factor is strictly forbidden in making decisions regarding the listing of species 
in the first place.
21
  This distinction is important to understanding the arguments I make 
in Part III.B of this article. 
 Critical habitat is defined as habitat which is ―essential to the conservation of the 
species.‖22  As noted above, the ESA defines ―conservation‖ as synonymous with 
recovery, so the combination of these two definitions makes clear that critical habitat is 
that habitat which the species needs in order to recover to the point of no longer being 
identifiable as threatened or endangered.
23
  Although these two definitions make it 
                                                 
17
 Id. § 1536(a)(1). 
18
 Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
19
 Id. § 1533(a)(3). 
20
 See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11
th
 Cir. 2007); 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 245 F.3d 434, 438-39 (5
th
 Cir. 2001). 
21
 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
22
 Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i)(I). 
23
 
23
 See Id. § 1532(3) (―The terms ‗‗conserve,‘‘ ‗‗conserving,‘‘ and ‗‗conservation‘‘ mean to use and the use 
of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to 
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abundantly clear that the goal of critical habitat is to recover the species to health, 
Congress took it a step further and provided for the designation of critical habitat that is 
no longer occupied by the species, but which is also deemed ―essential to the 
conservation of the species.‖24  The only conceivable reason to designate habitat not 
currently occupied by the species as critical habitat is in the hope that the species may use 
that habitat in order to expand its occupation to what it once was, i.e. recovery. 
 So, in a nutshell, what we see thus far is that the ESA requires the Services to list 
species as threatened or endangered, and then adds to that listing the designation of 
critical habitat.  Listing and designation are the essential labeling provisions which set the 
scene for later provisions with actual teeth.  The listings and designations are tools to 
work with later in the Act, and Congress must have sought to achieve something beyond 
what it could by working with listing alone.  The statutory definition of critical habitat 
indicates that this something was recovery. 
 
 B. Consultation 
 As noted above, federal agencies are not to take action ―likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification‖ of its critical habitat.25  This requirement is referred 
to as the ―consultation‖ requirement because action agencies must consult first with one 
of the Services.
26
  The prohibition against jeopardy is provided to a species simply 
because it is listed.  Because the very first factor considered in the decision to list a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary.‖). 
24
 Id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). 
25
 Id. § 1536(2). 
26
 See id. 
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species is ―the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its 
habitat or range,‖27 it is clear that a listed species can be jeopardized via harm to its 
habitat.
28
  Indeed, harm to habitat is frequently at issue in cases involving jeopardy. 
 Nonetheless, Congress saw fit to set aside certain habitat to be protected from any 
destruction or adverse modification at all, not just that which rises to the level of 
jeopardizing the continued existence of the species.  Clearly something more was at stake 
here or it would be superfluous.  Species were to be listed and protected from actions, 
including habitat modification, that placed their very existence in jeopardy, but on top of 
that certain habitat was to be identified for the conservation (i.e. recovery) of these 
species, and that habitat was to be more heavily protected in order to be available for that 
purpose.  In other words, agencies cannot damage critical habitat even if it would not 
jeopardize the continued existence of the species, as that habitat is there to promote 
conservation.  Clearly this adds value for the species above listing alone. 
 The Services published regulations defining both the jeopardy standard and the 
adverse modification standard, for the purpose of responding to consultations on actions 
proposed by other federal agencies.
29
  The key language in both definitions (as still 
currently codified, in spite of court decisions striking down portions of the language) is 
identical for both standards.  Adverse modification ―appreciably diminishes the value of 
critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species.‖30  To jeopardize is 
                                                 
27
 Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A). 
28
 Habitat modification can even rise to the level of qualifying as a ―take‖ under section 9.  See Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
29
 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
30
 Id. 
 10 
―to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species 
... .‖31 
 There are two issues with these definitions that are relevant to my proposal.  First, 
the use of the term ―both‖ before ―survival and recovery‖ (as well as the ―and‖) takes 
recovery completely out of the picture.  Any action that reduces the chances of survival 
reduces the chances of recovery, but not vice versa.  Actions that drastically reduce the 
chances of recovery but not of survival would all be permitted under these definitions.
32
  
Second, the substantive terms in the definitions are identical, thus calling into question 
the value of designating critical habitat at all (if doing so adds no protections above being 
listed).
33
  As discussed in the previous subsection, this simply cannot be.  The statute 
clearly envisions added protection via critical habitat, specifically protection of the ability 
to recover to the point of delisting. 
 
 C. Importance 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting 
[the ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the 
cost."
34
  Recovery of struggling species is the goal, not merely protecting the status quo.  
As a practical matter, however, there is only one provision in the ESA that lends itself to 
any significant potential for recovery, and that is critical habitat.
35
  The prohibition 
against ―take‖ protects individuals of a listed species from harm, which is more about 
                                                 
31
 Id. 
32
 For a discussion of this problem, see Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species Act: 
Playing a Game Protected Species Can't Win, 41 Washburn L.J. 114 (2001). 
33
 See generally Scarpello, supra note _. 
34
 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). 
35
 Second place goes to recovery planning, which lacks the teeth of critical habitat as its implementation is 
optional, whereas the language relating to both designation and protection of critical habitat is mandatory. 
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survival.  Likewise, the jeopardy standard, albeit not purely about survival (as I propose 
in Part V, there is and should be some concern for recovery in this analysis as well), is 
primarily focused on ―continued existence,‖ which does not necessarily require full 
recovery to the point of delisting.  The only place in the ESA where the express goal of a 
specific provision (as opposed to the general purposes stated for the Act) is recovery to 
this point is critical habitat.  It is thus arguably the most important piece of the entire 
puzzle. 
 Destruction and/or adverse modification of habitat is the leading danger to species 
in North America.
36
  Even with the protection of critical habitat as weak as it has been 
under the Services‘ regulations, species with designated critical habitat are more than 
twice as likely to improve their status and less than half as likely to decline in status.
37
  It 
is not difficult to see how significantly this could increase with critical habitat protected 
at a higher level focused on recovery.  Species with designated critical habitat are also 
more likely to have recovery plans created for them than the far more numerous species 
without designated critical habitat.
38
  Also, of all species with recovery plans those with 
designated critical habitat have greater task implementation than the rest.
39
  Moreover, 
                                                 
36
 Amy N. Hagen & Karen E. Hodges, Resolving Critical Habitat Designation Failures: Reconciling Law, 
Policy, and Biology, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 399, 400 (2006). 
37
 Martin F. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative Analysis, 55 
BIOSCIENCE 360 (2005).  See also J. Alan Clark et al., Improving U.S. Endangered Species Act Recovery 
Plans: Key Findings and Recommendations of the SCB Recovery Plan Project, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
1510 (2002) (finding that species with designated critical habitat were less likely to decline, more likely to 
remain stable, and more likely to improve). 
38
 E. Harvey et al., Recovery Plan Revisions: Progress or Due Process?, 12 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 
682 (2002). 
39
 Carolyn J. Lundquist et al., Factors Affecting Implementation of Recovery Plans, 12 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 713 (2002). 
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public awareness of critical habitat areas tends to result in greater general care efforts in 
these areas.
 40
  
 A road realignment proposal in Hawaii provided an excellent example of how 
differently a species can be treated simply because it has critical habitat.  The project was 
to take place within the critical habitat designated for the Palila, leading the U.S. Army 
and the federal Department of Transportation to propose $14 million in mitigation 
projects.
41
  However, there were more than a dozen other listed species in the project 
area, none of which had critical habitat designations.
42
  No mitigation measures were 
considered for these other listed species.
43
 
 Finally, a key advantage to critical habitat designation is that it is the only 
provision in the entire ESA that provides any protection for unoccupied habitat.  It stands 
to reason that a species that has diminished to the point of listing under the ESA is going 
to occupy less habitat than it did when it was doing well.  Naturally, if our goal is to 
recover the species to its prior condition, it will be necessary to protect some of its former 
habitat as well as that which it currently occupies.  That Congress acknowledged this 
need is evident from the fact that it provided for designation of unoccupied critical 
habitat.  The majority of species still do not have designated critical habitat and as such 
nothing is being done to prevent the complete development of their former habitat, which 
could make it too late for recovery once the Services are eventually forced to designate 
critical habitat for all. 
                                                 
40
 Testimony before the subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works.  108 Senate Hearings, Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat Issues 
(April 10, 2003). 
41
 Hagen & Hodges, supra note __ at 400. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
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III. The Functional Equivalence Theory and its Impact on Critical Habitat 
 The Services, unfortunately, have not recognized the distinction between the 
protections for listed species and those for critical habitat.
44
  The Fish and Wildlife 
Service has repeatedly expressed the view that critical habitat adds no protection beyond 
what is already provided to listed species via the jeopardy prohibition.
45
  Former 
Secretary of the Interior (which houses the Fish and Wildlife Service) Bruce Babbitt 
called critical habitat the least important provision in the ESA, stating that ―[y]ou could 
strike critical habitat from the statute tomorrow and no one would miss it.‖46 
 The big mistake was in drafting the defining regulations to treat the two protective 
standards identically in the first place, but the Services have used these regulations to 
bootstrap this position ever since.  The policy position that critical habitat adds nothing to 
listing has been informally known as the ―functional equivalence‖ policy, as the idea is 
that the two protections (jeopardy and adverse modification) serve identical functions for 
                                                 
44
 According to the Services, ―interpretation of the regulations, by definition, the adverse modification of 
critical habitat consultation is nearly identical to the jeopardy consultation standard.‖ Notice of Intent to 
Clarify the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,871, 31,872 (June 14, 
1999). 
45
 In its most recent public information document explaining critical habitat on its website, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service states: 
 
In consultations for species with critical habitat, Federal agencies are required to ensure 
that their activities do not destroy or adversely modify critical habitat to the point that it 
will no longer aid in the species‘ recovery. In many cases, this level of protection is 
similar to that already provided to species by the ―jeopardy standard.‖ However, areas 
that are currently unoccupied by the species, but are needed for its recovery, are protected 
by the prohibition against destruction and adverse modification of critical habitat. 
 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/factsheets/critical_habitat.pdf (visited March 17, 2010).  In other words, 
only unoccupied critical habitat provides additional protection, as the jeopardy standard accomplishes the 
same thing as the adverse modification standard in occupied areas. 
46
 Norris, supra note __ at 291. 
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the species and are thus redundant.  This notion is contrary to both science and 
congressional intent. 
 
 A. Designation Dearth 
 This situation led the Services to informally adopt a policy of disinterest in 
designating critical habitat because it was functionally equivalent to just being listed, and 
thus not the best use of limited resources.
47
  Although the ESA was amended in 1978 to 
make critical habitat designation mandatory, the Fish and Wildlife Service has only rarely 
done so, even since that time.
48
  As of March 17, 2010, out of the 1902 species (1542 
endangered and 360 threatened) that are listed as threatened or endangered under the 
ESA,
49
 only 546 have critical habitat designated for them.
50
  The Bush administration 
went so far as to require the Services to place a disclaimer in every proposed critical 
habitat designation, stating that ―designation of critical habitat provides little additional 
protection to species.‖51 
                                                 
47
 See, e.g., Sierra Club v FWS, 245 F.3d 434, 439 (5
th
 Cir. 2001), which described the following 
circumstance: 
 
The 1998 critical habitat decision by the Services relied on the ―not prudent‖ exception to 
the ESA. The Services noted, first, that ―[c]ritical habitat, by definition, applies only to 
Federal agency actions.‖ They observed that agencies would have to engage in ―jeopardy 
consultation‖ under the ESA where agency action could jeopardize the existence of a 
listed species. The Services reasoned that virtually any federal action that would 
adversely modify or destroy the Gulf sturgeon's critical habitat would also jeopardize the 
species' existence and trigger jeopardy consultation. Relying on the definitions of the 
destruction/adverse modification and jeopardy standards in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, the 
Services concluded that designation of critical habitat would provide no additional 
benefit to the sturgeon beyond the protections currently available through jeopardy 
consultation. 
 
(internal citations omitted). 
48
 For a discussion of this practice, see generally Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical Habitat Under the 
Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 209 (2000). 
49
 http://www.fws.gov/endangered/wildlife.html#Species (visited March 17, 2010). 
50
 http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/CriticalHabitat.do?nmfs=1 (visited March 17, 2010). 
51
 Hagen & Hodges, supra note __ at 400-01. 
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 The Services use their discretion under the ―prudent and determinable‖ language 
to support their inaction some of the time, but often they simply don‘t bother, and there is 
nothing the resource-limited wildlife advocates can do about it with such a huge number 
of species at issue.  The few that can be challenged are frequently won by the advocates, 
leading to a tiny handful of additional designations.
52
  This drop in the bucket is not 
enough.  Congress tasked the agencies with designating critical habitat concurrently with 
listing, and the tiny proportion of actual designations does not come close to fulfilling 
this statutory duty. 
 
 B. Twisted Economic Analyses for Designations 
 Although the ESA forbids consideration of economic impact during the listing 
process,
53
 it expressly includes it for designating critical habitat.
54
  This, of course, makes 
it necessary to assess the economic impact in order to take it into account, thus creating 
room for a great deal of error and/or disagreement.  Economic analyses invite challenge 
by their very nature as seemingly clear-cut but actually quite debatable.  What formula do 
you use and what figures do you run through that formula?  This has been an area of great 
confusion and has caused more trouble than one might expect given how little effort there 
has been to resolve it. 
 The Fish and Wildlife Service carried its functional equivalence philosophy into 
its economic analyses for the critical habitat designations it did perform.  Using what is 
known as the ―baseline method,‖ it placed all the existing costs to land-owners from the 
                                                 
52
 See Norris, supra note __ at 291. 
53
 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (listing decisions to be based solely on scientific information).  This just 
makes sense, as listing a species is simply a factual statement that the species meets a certain level of 
vulnerability and not a management action. 
54
 Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
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listing of the species into the baseline, then only considered the additional costs of the 
critical habitat designation, which was (thanks to the functional equivalence policy) 
generally nothing.  The use of the baseline method was based both on the fact that the 
ESA prohibited the consideration of economic impacts in listing species, and (more 
importantly) on the fact that these costs were not part of the cost of designating the 
habitat.  It was a reasonable exclusion of sunk costs, much as one would do in almost any 
kind of economic evaluation, but the combination of this method with functional 
equivalence was a bit nonsensical, given that the cost was always zero.  Essentially, the 
formula was correct but the data input was not. 
 This process effectively resulted in no economic analysis at all, writing yet 
another provision out of the statute.  Congress would not have required analysis of the 
economic impact of designating critical habitat if it did not envision that critical habitat 
would have a cost.  This is additional evidence of congressional intent that critical habitat 
would contribute further protections for the species beyond listing alone, as this is the 
only way for critical habitat designation to have a cost.  Indeed, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service impliedly acknowledges this with its position that there is no cost to consider 
because there is no added protection.  We cannot, however, pick and choose which parts 
of a statute to implement.  Critical habitat is in the statute, and Congress expressed its 
expectation that it would have an economic impact beyond listing (and thus that it would 
add further protections for the species). 
 In 2001, after many years of the Fish and Wildlife Service using this bizarre zero-
cost economic analysis for designations, the Tenth Circuit rejected the baseline approach 
for the very reason that it resulted in zero economic costs (under the functional 
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equivalence theory, which was not itself challenged in that case) and thereby rendered the 
ESA's requirement to consider economic impacts meaningless.
55
  The New Mexico Cattle 
Growers Court held that if the Fish and Wildlife Service could find no additional cost 
from designating critical habitat, then it must take the cost of listing out of the baseline 
and consider that cost instead, because the statute requires an economic impact analysis 
when designating critical habitat.
56
 
 This was a very odd result, in that it 1) rejected a perfectly appropriate method of 
considering what costs the designation added to a baseline of the economic impact of the 
existing listing; and 2) forced the agency to decide how much critical habitat to designate 
by considering the economic impact of the listing, which had nothing to do with the 
critical habitat designation.  How should the agency consider the economic impact of the 
designation, as required by the statute, when the cost is the same whether it designates 
one million acres or half that?  If the cost of listing is the only cost recognized, the figure 
will be the same regardless of how much critical habitat is designated.  This cannot be the 
type of analysis that Congress envisioned. 
 The approach after New Mexico Cattle Growers is equally nonsensical to the 
approach before the case, with the only difference being that the court required the 
appearance of following the statute via some form of economic analysis.  But that is not 
what the statute mandates – it requires consideration of the economic impact of 
designating the critical habitat.  The court even showed some discomfort with its own 
                                                 
55
 New Mexico Cattle Growers v. FWS, 248 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10
th
 Cir. 2001) (―Because economic analysis 
done using the FWS's baseline model is rendered essentially without meaning by [the regulations defining 
jeopardy and adverse modification identically], we conclude Congress intended that the FWS conduct a full 
analysis of all of the economic impacts of a critical habitat designation, regardless of whether those impacts 
are attributable co-extensively to other causes.‖).  An obvious flaw in this reasoning is that the court states 
that because of a problem with the regulations, ―Congress intended‖ something, which is backward 
thinking, as Congress may have intended a world with different regulations. 
56
 Id. at 1284-85. 
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result, but was in a bind as there had been no challenge to the functional equivalence 
theory itself.
57
  As a result, the wrong thing was struck down.  Instead of striking down 
the operating principle that was contradictory to the Act, the case struck down a method 
of economic analysis (the baseline method) that is entirely appropriate and has been 
widely embraced in many other contexts throughout environmental law. 
 The practical implications of this result were just as horrible as its logic.  Now 
that the Services were required to consider the cost of listing in determining the economic 
impact of designating critical habitat, that cost became far more significant and weighed 
more heavily against the benefit of designating the critical habitat, especially given that 
the agency saw no benefit anyway.  Not only did this place the species‘ needs at a 
disadvantage in the cost-benefit-analysis for new designations, but it also resulted in 
numerous challenges by developers to many prior designations, because that critical 
habitat was costing them money, but it had been designated after being deemed to have 
no cost at all.
58
  The irony, of course, of this position is the outright admission that critical 
habitat does impede development (or they would not have standing) and therefore does 
add protections that the jeopardy standard alone would not provide.  Perhaps there was 
just enough of a mess here for them to have their cake and eat it too.  In any event, 
Congress did not mandate an actual cost-benefit analysis for designating critical habitat – 
rather, it allowed the agencies to ―take into account‖ economic impacts,59 which is quite 
                                                 
57
 See id. at 1283 (―The root of the problem lies in the FWS's long held policy position that CHDs are 
unhelpful, duplicative, and unnecessary. Between April 1996 and July 1999, more than 250 species had 
been listed pursuant to the ESA, yet CHDs had been made for only two. Further, while we have held that 
making a CHD is mandatory once a species is listed, the FWS has typically put off doing so until forced to 
do so by court order.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
58
 For a detailed discussion of post New Mexico Cattle Growers cost-benefit analyses for critical habitat 
designations, see generally Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the 
Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 129 (2004). 
59
 This is clear from the legislative history, which states that ―[t]he Secretary is not required to give 
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different, and does not lend itself to striking down designations for inadequate 
consideration of economic impacts.
 60
 
 
 C. Easy Breezy Consultation Results 
 The final sting of the functional equivalence policy is the effect it has on the 
consultation process.  Because critical habitat is deemed to add no extra protection, 
everything gets pulled together under a jeopardy standard.  As mentioned before, under 
the current
61
 regulations, adverse modification ―appreciably diminishes the value of 
critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species,‖ much as to 
jeopardize is ―to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a 
listed species ... .‖62  If a species‘ very survival is not at stake, at least as the regulations 
were drafted, we can do what we want to critical habitat.  And this is how it has been 
applied for the many years that these regulations (and the corresponding functional 
equivalence policy) were going strong.  Sure enough, protecting critical habitat with this 
standard – a jeopardy standard, and a weak one at that – did not add much protection 
beyond listing alone.
63
  It was a self-fulfilling prophesy, and so long as the Fish and 
Wildlife Service followed its own regulations, never mind that the whole system was 
contrary to the statute.  Although this problem has received some attention via litigation, 
real change has yet to come. 
                                                                                                                                                 
economics or any other ‗relevant impact‘ predominant consideration in his specification of critical habitat.‖ 
Rather, ―[t]he consideration and weight given to any particular impact is completely within the Secretary's 
discretion.‖ H.R.Rep. No. 95-1625, at 16-17 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9467. 
60
 See Sinden, supra note __ at 196-97 (arguing that Congress only intended to give the agencies flexibility 
and not to require a cost-benefit analysis). 
61
 ―Current‖ in the sense that they have not been redrafted, though as we will see in the Part IV they have 
been heavily damaged by the courts. 
62
 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
63
 At least not as much as it could – and should – have, though as discussed above it has made some 
difference even as it is. 
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IV. Addressing the Problem in Piecemeal Fashion via Courts 
 The courts have begun to pick away at some of these issues, and have done some 
good case by case, but collectively these cases have actually muddied the waters 
significantly.  The various outcomes have generally increased protections but decreased 
clarity as to how the system should all work together.  This is to be expected as we cannot 
develop legislation or regulation via court cases dealing with only one issue and not 
addressing the whole.  Not one case has tackled the problematic functional equivalence 
theory itself, which is at the heart of all the critical habitat implementation problems.  In 
order to move toward a consistent and logical system that is compatible with the ESA, it 
is necessary for the Services to revise the regulations.  Judicial opinions have been 
striking down elements of the regulations or their implementation, but they cannot build a 
new system from scratch as is needed. 
 The two most important cases to move us in the right direction can be found in the 
Ninth and Fifth Circuits, both of which have held the critical habitat regulation to be in 
conflict with the statute.  In Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. FWS, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the regulatory definition of adverse modification to the extent that the ―both‖ language 
did away with any protection for the goal of recovery, a goal that is clear from the 
statutory definition of critical habitat.
64
  The court stated: 
Because it is logical and inevitable that a species requires more critical 
habitat for recovery than is necessary for the species survival, the 
regulation's singular focus becomes ―survival.‖  …  The FWS could 
authorize the complete elimination of critical habitat necessary only for 
recovery, and so long as the smaller amount of critical habitat necessary 
for survival is not appreciably diminished, then no ―destruction or adverse 
modification,‖ as defined by the regulation, has taken place. This cannot 
                                                 
64
 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. FWS, 378 F.3d 1059 (9
th
 Cir. 2004). 
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be right. If the FWS follows its own regulation, then it is obligated to be 
indifferent to, if not to ignore, the recovery goal of critical habitat.
65
 
 
 Years earlier, in Sierra Club v FWS, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the very same 
regulation, likewise because of the conservation goal behind critical habitat.
66
  The Sierra 
Club Court was dealing with a different context: the refusal to designate critical habitat 
on the basis that it was not prudent because it added no protection.
67
  The court held that 
the consultation regulation defining destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat 
needed to protect it at a level sufficient to support recovery, not just survival.
68
  Although 
this was a jab at the functional equivalence policy, the case did not address it head-on, 
and, in any event, it persisted thereafter. 
 These cases may have brought some life back to critical habitat‘s recovery goal, 
but frankly little has changed.  The regulations remain unedited, listings continue to be 
published without critical habitat designation, and consultations continue to be a farce.  
Even if we consider GP Task Force to be the current state of the law (as the Supreme 
Court has not spoken on the issue), this newly revived recovery element applied only to 
adverse modification of critical habitat and not to jeopardy.  Not surprisingly, a handful of 
district courts have since begun pointing out that NM Cattle Growers is no longer good 
law after GP Task Force (now that critical habitat protection has a higher recovery 
standard than mere jeopardy of a listed species, though GP Task Force never said the 
jeopardy standard was fine as-is – it simply wasn‘t at issue in the case), and have 
resultantly held that the baseline method is indeed the most appropriate way to consider 
                                                 
65
 Id. at 1069-70. 
66
 Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 245 F.3d 434, 441-42 (5
th
 Cir. 2001). 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
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economic costs.
69
  This is true not only in light of the fact that consideration of the cost of 
listing is not permitted, but more importantly because that is the only way to determine 
the true cost of designating the critical habitat.
70
 
 This string of cases may seem like a somewhat straightforward process that is 
gradually working its way to a clearly defined system (jeopardy considers only survival, 
adverse modification considers recovery as well, and those additional costs are the 
economic impact to consider when designating critical habitat), but the situation is not so 
simple.  In the midst of all this the Ninth Circuit rejected the practice of reading recovery 
out of the jeopardy definition, noting (among other points) that the word ―recovery‖ was 
used in the regulation and thus must have some meaning, and thus holding that the 
Services must in fact consider impacts on recovery when conducting a jeopardy 
analysis.
71
  The National Wildlife Federation Court went as far as to liken its impact on 
the jeopardy analysis to that of GP Task Force on adverse modification of critical 
habitat,
72
 thereby renewing the potential for functional equivalence.  Oddly, this opinion 
was not mentioned in the more recent Fisher v. Salazar decision (one of the district court 
opinions mentioned in the last paragraph as treating GP Task Force as the end for NM 
Cattle Growers), which based its reasoning for returning to the baseline method on 
                                                 
69
 See, e.g., Fisher v. Salazar, 656 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1371 (N.D.Fla. 2009); Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. 
Kempthorne, 534 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1032-33 (D.Ariz. 2008); Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance v. 
U.S. Dept. of Interior, 344 F.Supp.2d 108, 129-30 (D.D.C. 2004). 
70
 See Sinden, supra note __ at 163 (―[C]omparing the world with critical habitat against the ―baseline‖ of a 
world without critical habitat is the only sensible way to measure the impacts (economic or otherwise) of a 
designation.  An analysis that does otherwise--for example, an analysis that includes impacts that are 
caused co-extensively by listing and therefore would also exist in a world without critical habitat--cannot 
serve the purpose Congress intended.‖). 
71
 National Wildlife Federation v. NMFS, 524 F.3d 917, 931-32 (9
th
 Cir. 2008).  It is interesting to note that 
the reasoning in this Ninth Circuit opinion is exactly opposite that used in its GP Task Force opinion.  In 
the GP Task Force, it observed the regulatory language, ―both survival and recovery,‖ and stated that it 
meant only survival and was thus ignoring the recovery goal of critical habitat.  In NWF, it looked at this 
same language and stated that it used the term recovery and thus must have a recovery element. 
72
 Id. at 931-32. 
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distinguishing jeopardy from adverse modification in a manner inconsistent with the 
Ninth Circuit's holding in NWF. 
 Ultimately, the entire system is in a state of confusion right now.  Does NWF 
bring back functional equivalence, thereby reviving NM Cattle Growers and the bizarre 
method of considering the economic impact of listing rather than of habitat designation?  
Or should we go with the recent district court case, Fisher v. Salazar, ignoring NWF and 
maintaining the different levels of protection along with the baseline method for 
calculating the economic impact of designation?  The former brings us recovery 
protection for both standards, but leads to a nonsensical process for designation, and the 
latter provides a logical approach to designation but leaves an inappropriately weak 
standard in place for jeopardy analyses.  In reality the situation is more complicated than 
either of these approaches would suggest, as the survival/recovery dichotomy is a false 
one, and goals might exist in many places along the continuum in between.
73
  This 
language is purely regulatory, and it has caused a great deal of difficulty with 
implementing the statute, which itself does suggest a difference between jeopardy and 
                                                 
73
 There is evidence of a fleeting moment in time when some FWS staff recognized this, as we can see in 
the critical habitat designation for northern spotted owls in 1992: 
Section 7 prohibitions against the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat 
apply to actions that would impair survival and recovery of the listed species, thus 
providing a regulatory means of ensuring that Federal actions within critical habitat are 
considered in relation to the goals and recommendations of a recovery plan. As a result of 
the link between critical habitat and recovery, the prohibition against destruction or 
adverse modification of the critical habitat should provide for the protection of the critical 
habitat's ability to contribute fully to a species' recovery. Thus, the adverse modification 
standard may be reached closer to the recovery end of the survival continuum, whereas, 
the jeopardy standard traditionally has been applied nearer to the extinction end of the 
continuum. 
Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796, 1822 (Jan. 15, 1992).  
This statement, as we have seen above, is contradictory to nearly everything we‘ve heard from the FWS 
either before it or since.  Indeed, it contains concepts that the agency normally does not even seem to be 
aware of. 
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adverse modification (adequate to allow for a baseline method when analyzing the 
economic impact of designating critical habitat), but not such a stark one. 
 
V. Interpreting the Statute Holistically and Moving Forward Sensibly 
 A. Congressional Intent 
 A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that we must ―give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction 
which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it 
employed.‖74  To say that critical habitat protection is redundant to the existing protection 
against jeopardy is to refuse to give effect to several clauses in the statute.  Congress 
expressly included the requirement that critical habitat be designated concurrently with 
listing,
75
 so it must add something beyond listing.  Congress expressly required that 
federal agencies refrain from destroying or adversely modifying this habitat, once 
designated, and because Congress told the Services what to look for in designating 
critical habitat (areas of land ―on which are found those physical or biological features 
essential to the conservation of the species‖76), it provided a powerful suggestion as to 
what it meant by adverse modification (logically, harm to the features that led to the 
designation in the first place). 
                                                 
74
 Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). 
75
 Section 4(b)(6)(C), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C), provides in pertinent part:  
(C) A final regulation designating critical habitat of an endangered species or a threatened species shall be 
published concurrently with the final regulation implementing the determination that such species is 
endangered or threatened, unless the Secretary deems that-  
. . . . . 
(ii) critical habitat of such species is not then determinable, in which case the Secretary, with respect to the 
proposed regulation to designate such habitat, may extend the one-year period specified in subparagraph 
(A) by not more than one additional year, but not later than the close of such additional year the Secretary 
must publish a final regulation, based on such data as may be available at that time, designating, to the 
maximum extent prudent, such habitat. 
76
 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
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 These inclusions in the statute are enough on their own, without resort to 
legislative history.
77
  However, the legislative history supports the importance of critical 
habitat as well.  ―[T]he ultimate effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act will depend 
on the designation of critical habitat.‖78  Indeed, throughout the legislative history we 
find efforts to ensure that the limited areas of discretion provided to the agencies not be 
construed as diminishing the necessity of designating critical habitat.
79
 
 Indeed, Congress even went so far as to amend the statutory definition of critical 
habitat in 1978 to reject the regulatory ―survival and recovery‖ definition and give critical 
habitat more strength.  An appropriations bill from the following year describes the 1978 
amendments as follows: 
The term ―critical habitat‖ was not defined in the 1973 Act, but regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Act defined it to include ―air, land or water 
areas . . . the loss of which would appreciably reduce the likelihood of the 
survival and recovery of a listed species . . . .‖  The amendments adopted 
during the 96
th
 Congress significantly altered this definition.  The Act now 
defines ―critical habitat‖ as ―specific areas . . . on which are found those 
physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the 
species and (II) which may require special management consideration or 
protection.‖80 
 
                                                 
77
 ―Where the language of the statute is plain, it is improper for this Court to consult legislative history in 
determining congressional intent.‖  St. Charles Inv. Co. v. CIR, 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 2000). 
78
 H.R. REP. No. 94-887, at 3 (1976). 
79
 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978): 
The phrase ―to the maximum extent prudent‖ is intended to give the Secretary the 
discretion to decide not to designate critical habitat concurrently with the listing where it 
would not be in the best interests of the species to do so. 
As an example, the designation of critical habitat for some endangered plants may only 
encourage individuals to collect these plants to the species' ultimate detriment. The 
committee intends that in most situations the Secretary will, in fact, designate critical 
habitat at the same time that a species is listed as either endangered or threatened. It is 
only in rare circumstances where the specification of critical habitat concurrently with the 
listing would not be beneficial to the species. 
See also Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that Congress intended the agencies 
―only fail to designate a critical habitat under rare circumstances‖); Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. 
Supp. 621, 626 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (―This legislative history leaves little room for doubt regarding the 
intent of Congress: The designation of critical habitat is to coincide with the final listing decision absent 
extraordinary circumstances.‖). 
80
 H.R.Rep. No. 96-167, at 5-6 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557, 2561-62 (emphases added). 
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 In spite of the decades that the Services have spent treating critical habitat as 
superfluous and thus unnecessary, and in spite of the generations of leaders that have 
accepted that interpretation, this issue is the easy one.  There is no question now that 
Congress intended more, and this is gradually being recognized at all levels (though it has 
yet to be formally recognized or implemented).  Critical habitat must be protected to a 
degree adequate to promote recovery. 
 The tougher question is what degree of protection we provide via the jeopardy 
standard.  Although this article‘s focus is on how to move forward with critical habitat, 
the jeopardy interpretation is essential to doing so, as the two standards relate to one 
another in a very important way.  How do we calculate the economic impact of 
designating critical habitat, as is required by the statute, without knowing what to put in 
the baseline?  The only way to determine the cost of critical habitat is to determine what 
protections it adds to listing alone.
81
  In order to propose new regulations in a holistic 
manner we must interpret congressional intent as to the jeopardy standard as well.  
Moreover, until we sort out the relationship between the two standards, the Services will 
not step-up their effort to designate critical habitat. 
 An excellent starting point to our jeopardy inquiry can be found in the work of 
Professor Daniel Rohlf, who set out a decade ago to analyze the possible interpretations 
of jeopardizing the ―continued existence‖ of a species.  He stated: 
On one hand, one could interpret this phrase to preclude only activities 
that add to the risks faced by these species. If an action pushes a species at 
least some degree closer to extinction, that action clearly would render less 
likely the species' existence over time. Under this view, the implicit 
assumption is that the species will continue to exist over time unless 
additional threats or impacts push it closer to extinction. Thus, actions that 
                                                 
81
 I am assuming the use of the baseline method as that is the most logical way to analyze the cost of an 
action, as well as the method proposed in this article. 
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do not increase present risks to the species would not jeopardize that 
species. Even actions that did increase these risks could be interpreted as 
not necessarily jeopardizing the species, depending on how much of an 
increased risk of extinction they created. 
 
On the other hand, by definition listed species already face serious threats 
to their continued existence, additional potential impacts notwithstanding. 
Again by definition, these threats persist for a given species until over 
time its status improves to the point at which the Secretary changes it from 
its classification as threatened or endangered. In this light, an increase in 
present risks to the species' very existence would not be the only possible 
trigger for a jeopardy determination. One could also reasonably interpret 
an action to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species if the 
action precluded or even merely impaired the species' chances for eventual 
recovery. Put another way, threatened and endangered species' continued 
existence is in doubt as long as they are listed; therefore, impacts that 
foreclose or undermine a species' chances of recovery perpetuate its at-risk 
status and thus jeopardize its continued existence.
82
 
 
 The phrase ―continued existence‖ is forward-looking in its terms.  It may not 
invoke a sense of immediate pro-active recovery, but given that eventual recovery is 
important for continued existence (as a listed, and thus not recovered, species is always at 
risk of extinction), it would seem that interference with eventual recovery would place 
continued existence at greater risk.  The difference between protecting critical habitat 
from interference with its value to recovery and protecting species from interference with 
their potential for eventual recovery is not merely semantic.  An action still might take 
place outside of critical habitat which has the effect of delaying recovery but not 
foreclosing it, which would survive this jeopardy standard. 
 Indeed, this potential-for-recovery standard comports with the language used in 
the existing Consultation Handbook used by the Services, albeit not codified in the 
regulations.
83
  The survival definition in the Consultation Handbook, which has only been 
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 Rohlf, supra note __ at 126-27. 
83
 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Act Consultation Handbook: Procedures for 
Conducting Section 7 Consultations and Conferences, (1998), available at 
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in place for about a decade, marks a significant improvement over the typical 
understanding of it as merely the avoidance of immediate extinction.  It states: 
Survival: the species' persistence, as listed or as a recovery unit, beyond 
the conditions leading to its endangerment, with sufficient resilience to 
allow recovery from endangerment. Said another way, survival is the 
condition in which a species continues to exist into the future while 
retaining the potential for recovery. This condition is characterized by a 
species with a sufficiently large population, represented by all necessary 
age classes, genetic heterogeneity, and number of sexually mature 
individuals producing viable offspring, which exists in an environment 
providing all requirements for completion of the species' entire life cycle, 
including reproduction, sustenance, and shelter.
84
 
 
 This definition of survival places it closer to the middle of the spectrum from 
mere survival (ordinary definition, focused on the present) to recovery.  It is possible that 
actions can be proposed that will impede recovery (and thus would not be permitted if on 
critical habitat under my standard for that) but still not reach jeopardy under this 
definition (as they do not foreclose future recovery and leave in place the basic building 
blocks for that).  I propose taking a small step further than this definition.  However, 
clearly this standard protects far more than what has been protected in actual practice, 
both before and since the handbook was issued.
85
 
 If the Services were to actually follow this standard, it is actually quite reasonable 
as a jeopardy standard, assuming a species also has the appropriate recovery protection 
via critical habitat and a recovery plan.  This is key: Accepting a jeopardy standard that is 
anything less than full-recovery-focused requires proper implementation of the ESA as a 
whole.  No single ESA provision is adequate on its own.  The real action in the ESA is 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://endangered.fws.gov/consultations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm (visited March 29, 2010) [hereinafter 
Consultation Handbook]. 
84
 Consultation Handbook, supra note __ at 4-35. 
85
 Cite cases since handbook where survival-only no-jeopardy findings have been challenged (GP Task 
Force is one example, but will use others) 
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found in its recovery provisions: critical habitat designation and recovery planning.  
These are the pro-active ESA.  The prohibitions against jeopardy (applicable to federal 
agencies only) and take (applicable to all) are the defensive provisions.  It is like the 
efforts we make to build our wealth as compared to the things we do to protect ourselves 
from being robbed.  We need to do both.  That said, there is a big difference between 
getting your wallet swiped with a fresh ATM draw in it – which hurts but does not 
significantly impact your future – and having invested your retirement fund with Bernie 
Madoff.  There is only so much we can lose without seriously risking our potential for 
recovery. 
 Congress clearly envisioned recovery efforts for all listed species, and put in place 
provisions aimed at this goal.
86
  The jeopardy prohibition, referring to ―continued 
existence‖ even in the statute, does not appear to be a part of the pro-active recovery 
effort, but given the overall conservation purpose of the statute, federal actions should at 
a minimum not be permitted to significantly interfere with the attainment of this goal.  In 
order to create this safeguard, we need to protect at the level described in the 
Consultation Handbook, plus a little further, such that we prohibit not only those actions 
which foreclose recovery, but also those which significantly impede it.  This is still less 
than what is proposed here for critical habitat, which thus maintains its value as the 
primary recovery zone. 
                                                 
86
 But see J.B. Ruhl, Keeping the Endangered Species Act Relevant, 19 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 275, 288 
(2009) (―The ESA, perhaps to the chagrin of its most ardent supporters, is at bottom a harm-preventing law, 
not a benefit-mandating law. Causing take or jeopardy of species is prohibited, but promoting the recovery 
of species is nowhere required by the statute.‖).  Even those in favor of working toward recovery for listed 
species tend to view the ESA as inadequate to the task.  However, that is likely due to the fact that it has 
never been fully implemented.  Critical habitat designation is mandated by the statute, and is to be selected 
as needed for recovery and then protected in order to promote recovery.  That, if it were actually followed, 
is quite pro-active. 
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 Around the turn of the millennium NMFS adopted an approach using similar logic 
for jeopardy analyses of projects impacting anadromous fish.  The basic theory, and it is a 
sensible one, was that we can interfere with recovery to a point that will reduce the 
likelihood of survival, given that a listed species is less likely to survive in its depressed 
state than should its status be improved via recovery efforts.
87
  The Ninth Circuit upheld 
this approach against challenge, but did not go so far as to fully determine how jeopardy 
should be interpreted or applied.
88
  This concept should be applied more broadly, as well 
as codified, though we must take care to maintain the distinction between this and the 
recovery value of critical habitat or we render the latter meaningless. 
 Ultimately, if we are to draw clear distinctions for implementation as well as stay 
true to congressional intent, critical habitat is the land on which it is impermissible to take 
any action that appreciably reduces its value to recovery, regardless of whether the 
likelihood of recovery is appreciably diminished thereby.  On the other hand, actions 
reducing the value of other land to recovery, but not thereby significantly impeding 
recovery (perhaps due to the existence of other land, including critical habitat), would 
survive a jeopardy analysis.  Such land has not been designated as critical habitat and 
thus can be used freely so long as doing so does not jeopardize the continued existence of 
a listed species, including by significantly impeding its recovery.  Thus, critical habitat is 
protected by a far stricter standard.  Habitat modification is much more likely to be 
allowed elsewhere. 
 
 B. Amending the Regulations Defining Jeopardy and Adverse Modification 
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 Rohlf, supra note __ at 135. 
88
 Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Admin'r, Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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 Regardless of where you stand politically with regard to the degrees of protection 
that should be applied to jeopardy and adverse modification, one thing is very clear: the 
regulations are poorly drafted and need to be replaced.  The terms ―survival‖ and 
―recovery‖ really do not belong together at all in a well-drafted regulation.  As this article 
has already addressed throughout, using an ―and‖ between these terms writes recovery 
out of it and means the same thing as the term ―survival‖ would alone.  That said, it 
makes little sense to use the terms with an ―or‖ between them either, as this renders the 
term ―survival‖ superfluous (if you protect a species or its habitat at a level to promote 
recovery, you do far more than protect its survival).  Because survival is implicit in 
recovery, if we focus on the latter there is no need to refer to the former, which only 
serves to cause confusion.  Ultimately, the term ―survival‖ should be taken out of these 
regulations entirely. 
 That another decade has passed without any effort to amend these regulations in 
light of their being repeatedly struck down by the courts throughout that period is not 
only unacceptable; it is a tragedy for the many listed species that are not moving toward 
recovery under the status quo.  The Services have internally acknowledged the need to 
redraft at least the critical habitat regulation,
89
 but have neither done so nor 
acknowledged the need to redraft the jeopardy standard in light of the obvious problems 
with the language, also the subject of judicial criticism.  In fact, they recently published 
rulemaking amending 402.02, the definitions section of the consultation regulations in 
which the problematic jeopardy and adverse modification language is found, and did not 
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include proposed amendments for these portions.
90
  This, of course, raises the question as 
to whether they will ever get around to it, so this article is intended to give them a little 
push and some suggestions. 
 I propose the following language (or something like it) for the new regulations, in 
order to provide as much guidance as possible while still maintaining flexibility for 
varying circumstances: 
Destruction or adverse modification means a direct or indirect alteration 
that appreciably diminishes the value of any portion of designated critical 
habitat for the recovery of a listed species.  Such alterations include, but 
are not limited to, alterations adversely modifying any of those physical or 
biological features that were the basis for determining the habitat to be 
critical. 
 
Jeopardize the continued existence of means to engage in an action that 
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to significantly 
reduce the likelihood of eventual recovery of a listed species in the wild 
by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species. 
 
 By using the terms ―significantly‖ and ―eventual,‖ the jeopardy definition does 
not go as far as that for critical habitat, leaving the pro-active recovery effort to take place 
on designated critical habitat, where Congress intended.  Still, it includes implicitly the 
former protection of survival and goes a bit further by not letting actions outside of 
critical habitat seriously interfere with the work that is taking place within it. 
 Also, note the addition of ―any portion‖ to the adverse modification regulation.  
This prevents the very dangerous problem of framing the question as one of whether an 
action appreciably diminishes the value of all of a species‘ critical habitat, rather than just 
the action area.  It is possible for an action to completely destroy a portion of critical 
habitat, rendering it useless for recovery, without appreciably diminishing the value of the 
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whole, if the whole is much larger.  This would allow the chipping away of critical 
habitat little by little, which is contrary to the purpose of the ESA. 
 
 C. Returning to the Baseline Method for Analyzing the Economic Impact of 
Critical Habitat Designations 
 
 Once we have clarity with regard to the two levels of protection, especially as to 
the fact that they differ, the baseline method is the natural choice for analyzing the 
economic impact of critical habitat designations.  It is entirely inappropriate to consider 
any economic impacts that would exist absent the designation.  As such, I propose that 
the agencies publish a formal policy of returning to the baseline method once the new 
regulations are in place.  This will put a stop to the inconsistency we have seen in this 
area, and thus lead to greater fairness in the designations from species to species. 
 
 D. One More Problem: Implementation Sequence 
 There is one more very serious concern raised by what I have proposed in this 
article.  If we accept the view that critical habitat is the place for recovery and that once 
we are protecting it as such we can accept a lower standard for jeopardy, what happens to 
all those listed species that have no critical habitat designated for them?  There is nothing 
in place to protect their efforts at recovery, given that Congress placed that responsibility 
in the hands of critical habitat.  This is not a sufficient reason not to move to a holistic 
approach to the statute as proposed above, but does require special consideration in the 
short term. 
 Two steps are needed to resolve this problem, which stems from the decades of 
non-implementation of the ESA.  First, the Services need to request a temporary special 
 34 
appropriation of funds for the sole purpose of designating habitat for the species already 
listed but lacking critical habitat.  This should not be done in lieu of the Services‘ other 
ESA responsibilities such as new listings, but rather a special task force needs to be 
created to get this done.  Second, and in the meantime, listed species lacking critical 
habitat must receive special consideration in jeopardy consultations.  In the event that a 
proposed project is to take place on land likely to be designated as critical habitat, it 
should be protected as if it were already so-designated, at least until the actual 
designation can be determined. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The ESA is a complex machine with many moving parts and this has caused more 
confusion than necessary.  If we look at it more carefully, we see that Congress designed 
all these parts to work together and complement each other.  We do not need to interpret 
every single provision as being a pro-active step to recovery, but we do need to 
implement the critical habitat provisions as such, because Congress designed the statute 
to work that way.  If we interpret the ESA holistically, instead of piece by piece, we see 
how it all works together.  Critical habitat must be designated at the time of listing, as it is 
the primary conservation tool for listed species.  It then must be protected as such.  In 
considering the economic impact of such designations, we must look at the difference 
between what is achieved on the critical habitat (recovery) and the lesser protections 
afforded listed species generally.  This is the complete package Congress gave to wildlife 
decades ago, and it is time for its delivery. 
 
